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parked by a relatively simple idea that corporations have obligations to society that extend beyond mere profit-making activities -scholars and practitioners have struggled to achieve a clear paradigm for corporate social responsibility (Godfrey and Hatch, 2007) . This is largely driven by the lack of substantial empirical findings that can emphatically support or refute the link between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and a firm's financial performance (Godfrey and Hatch, 2007) . Margolis and Walsh (2001) catalogued over 90 empirical studies seeking to establish a link between CSR and improved financial performance, with mixed results. Despite this inadequacy, CSR has continued to have pragmatic and normative appeal for business professionals, academicians, and governmental policy makers alike.
However, there seems limited debate on the perspectives of CSR with respect to profit-oriented firms. The debate ranges between two extreme views, namely, the classical and the socioeconomic. Proposed by Milton Friedman (1962; and argued by authors like Barry (2000 Barry ( , 2002 , Coelho, McCLure and Spry (2003) , Henderson (2005) , Jensen (2001) , Sternberg (1997) , and Sundaram and Inkpen (2004) , the classical view, also called the shareholder approach, holds that corporate social responsibility is to maximize profit. This view, which is also known as the Agency Theory of corporate social responsibility, implies that directors of an organization are agents of the owners and are duty bound to maximize the interests of those owners, who had made the investment, in the first place (Sternberg, 1994; Rappaport, 1998; Taylor 1999; Dvorak, Guth, Landers and Zaun, 2000; Shirouzu, 2000) . This definition has widened to accept that maximization of shareholder value also entails fully integrating the interest of customers, community, suppliers, and employees into the company strategy (shareholders) in such a way that it ultimately facilitates the shareholder value (Schiebel and Pochtrager, 2003) . In its widest sense, a stakeholder is any identifiable group or individual who can affect the achievement of organizational objectives or who is affected by the achievement of organizational objectives (Freeman and Reed, 1983] , Clarkson, 1995) .
Opposing this is the socioeconomic view of social responsibility, argued by theorists like Freeman (1984) , Freeman and Werharne (1999) , Clarkson (1995) , Lazer (1996) , and Carroll (1999) who believe that businesses owe something back to the society that supports them, and that this debt is greater than the debt of any individual 
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presents emerging issues and ideas that call for action or rethinking by managers, administrators, and policy makers in organizations member of the society. Referred as the social contract approach, and based on the principle of communitarian ethics, it believes that corporations should be socially responsible, both, out of gratitude for their existence and a moral sense of reciprocation for benefits received from the society (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . This is a broad view on CSR which states that companies are responsible to society as a whole, of which, they are an integral part. They operate by public consent (license to operate) and therefore should constructively serve the needs of the society. This approach is illustrated by the concepts of corporate accountability and social justice (Dillbeck, 1999; Sacconi, 2004; Boatright, 2002; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1990) .
Is the debate on CSR orientation really so linear and simple? Do firms really take one of these opposite orientations? And how do firms decide on which orientation to take? This paper delves deeper into the different perspectives of CSR, taking the developmental economics framework of Oliver Williamson as the base, to explore the complexities of this area and understand the range of CSR orientations possible for a firm. The research aim is to apply framework of decision-making (as illustrated by Kreps, 1990 ) on corporate social responsibility in order to understand the possible orientations that can be followed by firms as part of their social engagement. Taking help from the framework, the paper proposes six possible perspectives that a firm can take for its CSR.
Williamson's framework looks at organizations from the developmental economics perspective. Two different outlooks are distinguished: (1) behavioural assumptions which drive the 'contractual' man, and (2) the attributes of economic transactions. Contrary to the typical CSR approach of treating behavioural assumptions as a matter of convenience, Williamson argues that 'understanding the action of decision-makers requires a more self-conscious attention to how their mind works'. He concurred with Bridgeman (1980) to draw the socio-economic-behavioural understanding of decisions. We use this framework to understand firms and their social orientations, and this forms the core of our investigation.
This paper explains that society-corporate transactions could be governed by the operating contexts and circumstances of firms. Theories illustrated in the paper reflect the variations that can exist (pure business dealings to societal contribution being one of the reasons for existence) and how these could be impacted by the current situation and circumstances of the firm (governed by environment uncertainty, degree of resource dependency on external environment, and frequency of external interactions needed).
EXPLORING NEW PERSPECTIVES: THE WILLIAMSON FRAMEWORK
Oliver Williamson (1990) , the 2009 Nobel Laureate in Economics, classified the decision-maker through two dimensions, namely degree of rationality and self interest, and generated a 3x3 matrix to define economic approaches/orientations of institutions. This 3x3 matrix applies three types of self-interest, namely, utopian (or benevolence), self-interest without guile, and self-interest with guile, i.e., opportunism. It applies three types of rationality, namely, completely rational, bounded rational, and behavioural.
Rationality
Rationality is the quality or state of mind which is in total agreement with reason or possession of reason (Ariely, 2008) . Rational behaviour is, therefore, "a process of inference or thought using information and knowledge" (Ariely, 2008) . Completely rational is the strongest form of rationality. In this form of rationality, the role of institution is suppressed in favour of the view that firms are production functions, consumers are utility functions, and allocation of activity between alternative modes is given, and optimizing is expected and imperative (De Alessi, 1983) . Hence all the costs are recognized and the optimal solution is taken, keeping formal and informal institutions outside of the decision arena (Meade, 1971) .
Bounded rationality is a semi-strong form in which economic actors are assumed to be "intendedly rational, but only limitedly so" (Simon, 1961) . It assumes that most transactions occur with limited information (though actors try to be rational). People negotiate using information and keep adapting the transaction over time. (Arrow, 1974; Simon, 1961) . Transaction cost economics acknowledges that rationality is bounded and Williamson encourages the study of institutions through this approach arguing that cognitive competence is limited.
Organic rationality is the weak form of rationality. It is an 'evolving' form of rationality where institutions, markets, and laws are seen to be changing and dynamic. In the organic model of thinking, organizations are compared to biological systems which constantly adapt to their environment (Alchian, 1950; Nelson and Winter, 1982) . As they are not passive objects for environment manipulation, they can also exert influence on the environment. Hence, organic rationality believes that it is not possible to calculate all the costs and have optimal solutions, keeping formal and informal institutions outside of the decision arena (Scheerens, Glas and Sally, 2003) .
Self-interest Orientation
Williamson identifies three levels of self-interest, namely opportunism, simple self-interest, and obedience. The strongest form, the one to which transaction cost economics appeals, is opportunism. The semi-strong form is simple self-interest-seeking. Obedience/Utopian is the weak (really null) form of self-interest-seeking.
Opportunism refers to self-interest-seeking with guile. It often involves subtle forms of deceit, both active and passive, like incomplete or distorted disclosure of information. It is responsible for real or contrived conditions of information asymmetry (Gauss, 1952) . From the economics and organizations' point of view, opportunism is a source of 'behavioural uncertainty' in economic transactions, which would vanish if the individuals were completely honest and open in their efforts to realize their individual gains.
Open or simple self-interest-seeking is the motivational assumption on which new classical economics relies. Simply put, it is fulfilling one's own interest without incurring loss or harm to others (i.e., without guile). This merely presumes that bargains are struck on terms that reflect original positions. But initial positions will be fully and candidly disclosed upon inquiry, state of the world declarations will be accurate, and execution is oath-or rule-bound in the manner described above.
Obedience is the assumption associated with social engineering (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971) . It is complete absence of self-interest and of the basic "mechanical orderliness" of economics (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971 ). However, this condition is not simple to achieve. Williamson says that robots have this feature that they satisfy obedience requirements at zero social conditional cost. This position is considered utopian for human achievement.
The Framework
These differing contexts and circumstances interact with three types of self-interests, namely, utopian (or benevolence), self-interest without guile, and self-interest-seeking with guile, i.e., opportunism; and three types of rationality, namely, complete rationality, bounded rationality, and behavioural rationality. These interactions lead to combinations of nine dimensions. Figure 1 illustrates the framework which leads to the dimensions. Williamson defined the two continuums of utopian and completely rational as follows: Utopian here means maximizing social good, while completely rational means ability to foresee all contingencies and choose the best action. A completely rational leadership's decision will take into consideration the aspect of profitmaximization whereas a leader that is bounded rational and utopian has a "restricted sense" of CSR and will take decisions giving priority to welfare maximization within an already defined group or will take decision making some forecast of the future. If the nature of leadership falls into the "behavioural and utopian" matrix, it means that his decision is influenced by his learning, society, and culture despite the nature of the problem and other binding factors. According to Williamson, any economic organization can fit into any one of the 6 boxes in his 3x3 matrix. Source: Kreps (1990 
THEORIZING ECONOMIC RATIONALITY OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
The differing contexts and circumstances interact with three types of self-interests and three types of rationality. These interactions lead to combinations of nine dimensions, which can be explained by six main theories (endorsed by Williamson). It should be noted that the combinations of behavioural and self-interest with guile and behavioural with self-interest without guile form an explanation by evolutionary methods (Kreps, 1990 . They get partly captured through evolutionary economics. Thus, the 3x3 framework is described by six main theories.
Deliberating on the Williamson Philosophy
Williamson argued that humans/human systems are 'contractual' by nature. They get into explicit and implicit contracts with others, including with the society. Within this contract (with the society), three aspects of transactions take place that define the quality of this contract, namely, asset specificity, extent of uncertainty, and frequency.
A transaction has high level of asset specificity when the human/system has high dependence on the societal or external setup. For example, an orange drink manufacturing firm will locate its plant where raw material is available and preferably adjacent to a bottle cap making plant. This firm, therefore, will have high local dependence and its assets will have high dependence on external forces. An example of low asset specificity or dependence on external forces will be a software manufacturing firm. The nature of its business requires minimum interaction with the local external forces.
The second quality of transaction is the extent of uncertainty faced. For the orange drink manufacturer, the nature and extent of uncertainty faced will be different from the software manufacturer. While the software firm will face uncertainty inherent in a competitive environment, the orange drink manufacturing firm will face uncertainty of raw material and external stakeholders' approval. This gives rise to different degrees of bounded rationality for both. Firms are expected to anticipate these kinds of contingencies and deal with them. Hence, a new firm entering India in the highly competitive Information Technology industry, may not invest in any long-term CSR venture.
Finally, there is frequency of transactions which may not bear directly on the survival and financial well-being on the firm but influences relative costs. When interaction between two parties occurs frequently, they are typically seen to construct special governance structures for the interaction and reduce their direct costs and direct implications. For example, if companies need local support and local approval (like the orange drink manufacturer), putting up public partnership structures and community development structures are natural economic saving initiatives. Hence, Williamson says that transactions and contracts are varied and governed by the operating contexts and circumstances.
Applying this philosophy, six theories combining rationality and interest emerge as relevant. These six theories take support from Krep's explanation of the Williamson framework. These are information economics, economics of general equilibrium, transaction cost economics, theory of temporary equilibrium, team theory, and evolutionary theories. Table 2 illustrates these six main theory types.
THE THEORIES Information Economics Theory
Applying to the first combination (completely rational and self-interest with guile), proposed by 2001 Nobel Laureates, George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz, the theory of information economics deals with how information affects economic decisions. Information has some special characteristics like speed and ease of spreading, has limited control mechanisms, and creates barriers of credibility, trust, and asymmetry (Molho, 1997; Hogdin, 1984; Stigler, 1961; Telser, 1973) . This gives it an economic value. It allows decision makers to make choices that yield higher expected payoffs or expected utility than they would obtain from choices made in the absence of information (Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Goldman and Johansson, 1978) . Specifically, organizations enter the CSR arena with various predispositions and certain expectations, which gets modified as they experience and progress through and collect more information about CSR economics and its ability to maximize utility (Hogdin, 1984; Shapiro and Varian, 1999) .
Economics of General Equilibrium
The theory of general equilibrium, proposed by French economist, Leon Walras (1834 -1910 , in his "Elements d'Economie Politique Pure" (1874), applies to the second combination, namely, completely rational and selfinterest without guile. It explains that behaviour of supply, demand, and prices in a whole economy, with several or many markets, exist in equilibrium (Buetre, Rodriguez and Pant, 2003; Stenberg and Siriwardana, 2005; Dee, 1991) . Economic equilibrium is a balance of all the gradients, similar to the concept of force balance in mechanics in an equation which has utility maximizing consumers and profit maximizing producers (Irving Fisher, 1933; Bandara, 1991; Alavalapati, Adamowicz and White, 1998 ).
According to this perspective, CSR can be seen as decided in such a way that choices of economic agents are coordinated across all product and factor markets. Hence, solutions are sought in a constrained optimization solution, looking at all the various options available to the decision maker. Hence CSR of a firm would converge automatically towards the same position as the firm.
Theory of Transaction Cost Economics
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is most associated with the work of Oliver Williamson (The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 1985) . Transaction cost theorists assert that the total cost incurred by a firm can be grouped largely into two components -transaction costs and production costs. Transaction costs, also called coordination costs, are the costs of "all the information processing necessary to coordinate the work of people and machines (production costs) that perform the primary processes (production), (Williamson, 1996 (Williamson, , 1979 Hart and Moore, 1990) . In this, the firms are profit maximizing, and profit maximization involves cost minimization (Hart and Moore, 1990; Grossman and Hart, 1986) .
By implication, CSR would be part of the equilibrium, where firms try to minimize their total costs, mainly social transaction costs. More specifically, within an organization, decision makers will take CSR decisions (social transactions costs), directed by the costs associated in the market (Adams, 1994) .
Theory of Temporary Equilibrium
The temporary equilibrium theory, proposed by John Hicks (1939) and analysed rigorously by Jean-Michel Grandmont (1977) and Grandmont and Laroque (1976) says that the action of agents depends on their forecasts of what the future will be. The theory deals with situations of uncertainty, imperfect information or information costs, where agents take their decisions taking into view some forecast of what the future will be (Patinkin, 1965; Grandmont, 1977) . Hence, the forecasts are the value of expectations or expectation functions (Mankiw and Romer, 1991; Wallace, 2001) .
From the CSR perspective, at any moment, decision makers have to make decisions in the face of a future that is as yet unknown. Expectation about the unknown future, therefore, plays an essential role in the determination of current CSR decisions (versus say the expectations that a trader holds at any time is determined by the information that he has at that moment and date in time). CSR processes are thus the result of a strong and complex interaction between expectations of the people involved and the actual realizations of economic variables (Grandmont, 1977 (Grandmont, , 1987 Patinkin, 1965; Wallace, 2001) .
Team Theory
Formally introduced by Marschak and Radner (1972) in their book, Economic Theory of Teams, the team decision theory acknowledges bounded rationality but assumes that agents have identical preferences. It studies decision making in an environment where many decision makers are present, each one has his own information and all strive towards satisfying the same goal. The notion of a team implies a cooperative attitude among the decision makers (Kim and Roush, 1988; Marschak and Radner, 1972) . Mathematically, the task is to find functions that maximize an objective function.
CSR, in such a scenario, reduces to the selection of rules of action that coordinate the interdependent activities of the teammates to maximize the expected payoff of the team (Kim and Roush, 1988; Akbari, Kagiwada and Kalaba, 1980) . This theory implies that corporate and society can work as a team. This is, however possible, only if both have the same utility function (for example, social welfare).
Theory of Evolutionary Economics
This theory is based on Veblen (1898 Veblen ( , 1899 who said that power relations take precedence over the price mechanism. Firms are seen to be satisfiers rather than optimizers and are bounded rational Winter, 1974, 1982) . They operate according to decision rules which are not based on maximizing behaviour. There is no global objective function, no well-defined choice set and firm behaviour cannot be rationalized completely (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 1987) .
Routines are central to this theory. They are seen to be the persistent features which determine the possible behaviour of firms. They get inherited and selected according to the advantage they provide and "favourable reproduction" they generate. Hence, routines play the role of 'genes'. Price competition being less important than other forms of competition (like R&D expenditure and CSR expenditure), firms are not passive to their environment and strive to alter the competition and environment in their favour.
CSR, from this perspective, emerges from actions of diverse agents with bounded rationality who may learn from experience and interactions and whose differences contribute to the change. This theory clearly puts CSR at the centre of the financial decisions of firms and extends social issues to economic interactions between firms and society.
DELIBERATIONS ON THE CORPORATE-SOCIETY INTERACTION
The Socio-Economics of CSR Analysing CSR through the Williamson framework clearly brings forth the 'contractual' nature of corporate and society (both explicit and implicit) interactions, and gives a perspective on the variations that can exist (from being pure business dealings to societal contribution being one of the 'raison d étre' of existence) in this relationship. This 'contract' is guided by the behavioural assumptions of a firm's values and the degree of its external orientation. This strategic nature of CSR gets reflected in all the perspectives. Through CSR, firms work to address industry/societal challenges in a strategic way that would create competitive advantage, and come to terms with values of societal survival. The transactional relationship seemed to balance the interplay between this societal governance and firm success, i.e., shareholder value and individual social contract.
Moreover, CSR analysis through the Williamson framework suggests a much wider view of 'equilibrium' taking all stakeholders and factors into consideration. It proposes a stable equilibrium for firms, unlike the existing perspectives. Firms typically develop long-term explicit and implicit contracts with societal institutions (Schmidheiny, 2006; Gutierrez, 2003; Environics, 1999; IMRB-Partners in Change, 2007) , and this can be easily studied and investigated through this Williamson approach. It balances the systemic value and individual value (Pachauri, 2004; Puranik and Arora, 2004) .
Variations in Orientation: Operating Contexts and Environments
As illustrated earlier, describes these contractual relationships as influenced by the dimensions of the production situation, namely, asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency.
Asset specificity is a critical firm-specific dimension, and relates to the degree to which organizational resources have been customized to suit the society. CSR will be internally organized and strictly arranged (high asset specificity) in companies working with communities which provided them with raw material like oil seeds, sugarcane, etc. Contrary-wise, CSR will be discreetly arranged in generalized capacity and evolving like employee voluntary community outreach programmes in companies where asset specificity to society is low. Hence, depending on their arrangement with the society, these assets (social and production) could have high dependency on each other or be unique and non-specific.
Environmental uncertainty, i.e., changes in the nature and volatility of the environment, also impacts a firm's CSR orientation. For example, unstable political regime or highly competitive environment will impact organizational behavioural assumptions, and in turn influence their CSR.
Lastly, frequency, i.e., the number of interactions required between the society and the firm, also impacts the firm's CSR orientation. When the potential damage of non-interaction is large, then the firm invests in specialized interactions with the society. If the damage is small, such investments may not be seen as worthwhile. Thus, in-house impact and internal conditions would be associated with large or small scale of society-corporate interactions. For instance, better dealing with special interest groups like environmental groups, would possess an advantage over a less adequate or environmentally sensitive organization when entering markets with environment-sensitive customers (Baron, 1985; Farh, Tsui, Xin and Cheung, 1998 ).
A transaction with high level of asset specificity, i.e., the corporate having high dependence on the government or local setup, like a chemical producing firm or an oil production firm, would have a different operating context than an information technology software developing firm which does not have high dependence on the local setup. Similarly, the second quality of transaction, i.e., the extent of uncertainty faced would be different for both firms. The software developing firms are expected to face a different degree of external environment uncertainty than a chemical or oil production firm. In such case, it could be expected that the chemical or oil production firm would have a higher degree of bounded-ness in its rational decision-making and would be more equilibrium-seeking than the software firm. Similarly, state-owned enterprises would be more equilibrium-seeking (versus opportunism) given their government ownership.
This analysis explains that society-corporate transactions are governed by the operating contexts and circumstances of firms. The six theories illustrate the variations that can exist (pure business dealings to societal contribution being one of the reasons for existence) and Williamson illustrates how these could be impacted by the current situation and circumstances of the firm (governed by environment uncertainty, degree of resource dependency on external environment, and frequency of external interactions needed).
CONCLUSION
Literature on theoretical underpinnings of CSR reflects three distinct, discontinuous perspectives, namely, shareholder value, stakeholder value, and societal value. This explanation is limited and fails to capture the entire gamut of CSR perspectives. The aim of this paper is to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the determinants of CSR, putting the various pieces into a continuum, explained by larger theoretical orientations of various firms.
Applying the Williamson's framework, several perspectives of CSR emerge. One, while profit maximization is the focal point of a firm, it does not take the firm away from socially responsible activities. The framework described in the paper shows that CSR do not belong outside of the corporate domain. It is an equal and parallel task of a firm, executed by the directors according to the welfare orientation taken by its owners and investors. Two, CSR orientation of a firm is a continuum. Companies pursue the wider social and economic objectives, according to their CSR orientation consistent with their understanding of organizational enhancement (Tudway and Pascal, 1993; Zaun, 2000; Wessel, 2001) . Three, Williamson's framework clearly sees organizations from the developmental economics perspective, which is the focal point of their existence. He looks at the behavioural assumptions which drive the 'contractual' man, and emphasizes the various types of socio-behavioural transactions and their importance in corporate decision-making and CSR. He concurred with Bridgeman (1980) to draw the socio-economic understanding of decisions and emphasize the 'thinking' aspects of organizations.
Thus, Williamson's classification and theories help study the question of society-corporate 'contract'. Our aim was to develop propositions through an integrative approach to corporate social initiatives. 
